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POLITICAL CRIME AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
POLITICAL crime is begnning to be heard of in this country.
I propose to examine the French theory and practice in respect to
political crime, and compare them with the Anglo-American.
Garqon, the distinguished authority upon the criminal law of
France, says that contemporary criminal law distinguishes felonies
and misdemeanors that are political from those that are common.' To the same effect is Garraud, the classic writer on the
criminal law of France.
"Political crimes [says the last named author] are to a less
extent directed against the very bases of social life than they
are against the established order. They have not, then, the same
nature as the ordinary crimes. The motives which urge to action
in political crimes are most often disinterested, sometimes they
are even laudable. Political crimes have not, then, the same
immorality as the common crimes. A rational legislation will
repress these two classes of crime by different penalties, because
political criminality is of an entirely distinct nature from that of
2
ordinary criminality."
The history of legislation on the subject of political crime is
long and interesting. 3 We cannot, however, linger over this
fascinating and instructive story. We may, in running, glance
at the Revolution of 1830 and note that the distinction between
1 Gargon, Code P~nal, annot6, Art. 1, No. 124.
2 Garraud, Pr~cis de droit criminel, onzi~me edition, Paris, 1912, p. 88 fol.
3The authorities will be found collected in Professor Garcon's Code
Pinal, annoti, Art. 1.
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political and common crimes comes into French legislation about
1830.4 By 1848 the principle that no extradition will be permitted in political crimes is established. 5 Since the last named
Revolution of 1848 no doubt upon the subject has ever been entertained. that political crimes should be dealt with upon a different
footing from that of ordinary crimes. The Constitution of 1849
also enshrined the principle that the jury and not the judge has
jurisdiction of political felonies. 6 Some political misdemeanors
go to the Correctional Courts (Tribunaux Correctionels), presided over by three judges without jury; others go to the Cour
d'Assises-the court for the trial of common felonies, presided
over by three judges and having a jury. 7 There are two exceptions to the principle just enunciated in that misdemeanors due
to speech and press (delits de la parole et de la presse) are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Cour d'Assises ;8 and in that the
Senate may be constituted a High Court of Justice for the trial
of certain political crimes-as in the recent Malvy case.0
The great problem is, of course, to determine what political
crime is. There is little difficulty in deciding what is a purely
political crime.
"A purely political crime is that which has not only as predominant characteristic, but draws along with it as an exclusive
and single consequence, the destruction, modification or the troubling of the political order in one or more of its elements. This
order includes: in regard to external matters, the independence
of the nation, the integrity of its territory and the relations of
the State with other States; in regard to internal affairs, it
includes the form of the government, the organization of public
powers, their mutual relations, in short, the political rights of
citizens. We can recognize without dispute, purely political
crimes in the following cases: communication with the enemy;
the levying of arms against one's government; conspiracies and
attempts to change the form of the government; affiliation with
unlawful societies; press crimes (except attacks against private
persons) ; violations of the laws relative to elections, public
assemblies, etc. All these crimes offend only public law and
interest."' 0
4 Garraud,

op. cit. p. 84 note.

5 Gar;on, op. cit. Art. 1.
6 Garg;on, op. cit. Art. 1, No. 134.
7
Garcon, ib. No. 135.
8
lb. 143.
0 1b. 143.
10 Garraud, op. cit. p. 86 fol.
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"All speech an(d press crimes are certainly not political. Ne
one dreams, for example, of placing in the category of political
crime the defamation and the injury of private persons. On the
contrary, we do not doubt that the following must be considered,
by their nature, political crimes: the defamation, in their public
quality and by reason of their functions, of the ministers or the
members of parliament: offenses against the ]'resident of the
Republic,' or against the I-leads of foreign States; violence to
foreign diplomatic agents.""
Again, crimes against the internal or external security of the
State are political crimes ;':- crimes of association and combination
and of unlawful meetings;"' riotous assemblies ;14 espionage."
"The difficulty of determining whether a crime is political or
common commences jsays Garraud] when the crime is a violation of law which without doubt, taken in itself, injures an individual or the State considered as a private person, but which, .in
the intention of the author, has a political motive, end or occasion. Crimes of this class are called, in technical language, conple.r crimes and connected crimes. The crime is comple.r or
mixed. when the same criminal fact injures at the same time the
political order and the ordinary penal law: or when a breach of
the ordinary penal law is committed with a political intention.
Such is the assassination of the Head of the State with the object
of overturning the government. Crimes are called connected
with a political fact when violations of the common penal law are
cotumitted in the course of political occurrences and have a certain
relation with these occurrences. (Code d'instruction criminelle,
Art. 227.) Such would be the pillaging of the shop of an armorer
by political insurgents."'
A criterion is in these and similar cases most vital. There
are the subjective and the objective theories. The former theory
leads to the following consequence that"the inteition. the motive, the end the actor proposed to
reach, characterize the criminality of the act. According to this
theory, murder, assassination, assault and battery. and theft would
be considered political crimes. The latter theory conduces us tb
the proposition that the political or non-political character of an
act which is legally criminal, is not to be considered as being
determined by the existence of political motives; this character
would depend upon the nature of the act considered in itself.
11 Gar;on, op. cit. Art. 1, No. 179.
12 Garcon, No. 176.
13 Garqon. ib.
14 Gargon, ib. No. 177.
15 Garqon, No. 178.
") Garraud, op. cit. p. 86 fol.
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These theories are exaggerated. The question
cannot be resolved
except by distinguishing two situations.' 11
The conclusion of Garraud is that periods of peace are to be
differentiated from periods of war; and that, making this distinction, in time of peace an act which would be considered a violation of tJhe ordinary penal law will be dealt with as such, notwithstanding that the end or the motive of the author was political. The objective theory is here put into effect, in accordance
with which the character of the act is determined by the act
itself and not by the motive, the intention, or the end envisaged
by the author. But "the judge, in examining into the culpability
of the individual, may take into account the more or less antisocial, and more or less odious -motives of the criminal act. But
this act remains, whatever the motive which has inspired it, that
which it is in itself-an assassination, an arson, a theft, a destruction -of buildings, that is, ordinary crime, a crime of the ordinary
penal law.'ls
In time of war, however, acts which would be considered
in times of peace to be common crimes may bear the character
of political crimes. The distinction here is that"if the violation of law is committed in the course of political happenings, as an insurrection or a civil war, pillages, murders. burnings, which would be legitimate if produced in a state of
regular war, would, in a measure, be absorbed by the political
crime of which they are the necessary consequences or the accidents. This political crime must cover them from the point of
view of extradition and from that of the application of the penalty of death. But if, in the course of the insurrection, crimes
are committed against persons or property which would be condemned by the law of nations, even in a state of regular war,
these crimes would come within the ordinary penal law. If it
is just to recognize that all acts which are the direct consequences
of the insurrection must be deemed to be political as the.insurrection itself is political, it would be immoral to consider as
political prisoners, malefactors who profit from the disorder to
satisfy their vengeance or their cupidity." '
The French theory, therefore, is the objective.
The consequences that flow from political crime are concerned
with the penalty,20 with the treatment of the offender in prison,
with the procedure in court. The death penalty cannot be
Garraud, op. cit. p. 87.
Garraud, op. cit. p. 88.
19 Garraud, op. cit. p. 88.
20 See Garon. op. cit.. Art. 86, No. 8. The penalty of death was abolished
in France for political crimes after the Revolution of 1848.
17

18
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imposed;' " certain forms of imprisonment are not permitted;
certain others are definitely prescribed. There is no incapacity
after conviction to serve in the army ;22 there can be, for another
example, no temporary suspension or dismissal from the medical
profCssion.2
Political amnesties are given 24 and are frequent
and normal. The prison privileges are extensive ;-'political prisoners are not compelled to work; they do not wear thd prison
garb: they are kept in places separate from those where offenders
of the ordinary penal law are kept; and may have their food
brought in from outside. Extradition is not allowed..2 ' The procedure at trial I have already pointed to in passing. All felonies
go to the court with a jury, in which the jury is the judge of the
law and the facts. Most misdemeanors also go to the same court.
These are for the most part special provisions not only in
France, but in almost all Continental countries for the benefit
of political prisoners and convicts. But there are some provisions of law which apply to political prisoners as well as to all
other prisoners. They are, briefly, the theoretic impotence of the
judges in jury trials. The President of the Court-there are
three judges-does take an active part in all trials; but the effect
of his participation and occasional partisanship is minimized, if
not obliterated, by the independent and intelligent character of
the juries. Both theoretically and practically, however, the jury
is master of the law, and the facts; and this principle is carried
so far as to exclude any charge by the judge. The defendant
has the right in all criminal trials to present all the evidence in his
favor, and against the prosecution, which he wishes. This principle is crystallized and consecrated in the formula that the
defense must be free. This free defense means not only that
the defendant himself shall be free to say anything in his favor,
but that he may bring forward any witnesses he pleases who
also shall be free to express themselves fully and unhindered.
One of the implications of this freedom is that the testimony is
to be given by deposition, that is, by narration. During this narration by the witness he is not interrupted. He must be allowed
to continue in his own way. After the narration, he may be
21 Garraud, p. 84.

22

Gargon, No. 141.

23 Gargon, No.142.
24 Gargon, No. 137.
25

Garraud, p. 84.

26 Garraud,

p. 89.
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questioned by his side, by the other side, and by the court; but
he always has the right of reply. It will be seen that the Continental theory is the reverse of the Anglo-American. The witness, in our system, is at the mercy of the court and of the attorneys. In a conflict with an attorney our judge takes the side of
the attorney. But the spirit of independence is so high abroad
that witnesses will not submit to ill treatment even at the hands
of barristers and judges. One would think that under such a
system of freedom to present evidence, trials would be interminable, and that, secondly, the absence of exclusionary rules of
evidence would militate against the search for truth. But this
is* not so. Trials are much shorter than they are among us;
they are much more interesting; they bring out many facts we
exclude; they present a clearer and ampler view of the whole
case; and they are not obnoxious because of the introduction of
hearsay and other evidence which under our system would be
inadmissible. Nauseating wrangles between opposing counsel
on the admissibility of evidence are unknown. The prosecution
is free to present its case as fully as it pleases; and the preliminary investigation by the juge d'instruction helps a great deal
toward this object: and the defense is also free to explain as fully
as it wishes. A complete presentation of the defendant's case is
thereby assured. And especially is this so in political cases where
the necessity seems to be greatest because of the character of the
alleged unlawful acts committed. The defendant. again,-continuing the review of the general procedure in criminal cases on
the Continent-has the right to close. He considers the right of
the last word a precious one: and anyone who has seen an ordinary trial, or, in particular, a recent political trial in this country,
will immediately concede the high importance of the final speech.
These general elements in criminal procedure should be pondered by us. They are all important, and especially are they so
in cases of political crime, where it is vital to the defense to labor
within a medium which gives free and full movement. We ought
to recognize the distinction between political and other crime;
we ought, in political cases, to give the right to the jury of deciding upon the law and the fact, and take away the power of the
judge to instruct on the lawY.1 To be sure, the jury is not much
27

One or two judges in New York City made wonderfully courageous

charges to juries; and one or two elsewhere gave the defendants a large
latitude in the presentation of evidence. But this was, of course, a matter

of discretion. What is needed is the right to free presentation.

POLITICAL CRIME AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

to be depended on. flut in numbers there is sometimes strength
to the opponents of the established order, because of possible
divisions in the ranks of standpatters and because of the possibility of hitting upon one man in twelve who may see the justice
of the defendant's case, though that case may be in a hopeless
minority. We ought to give the defendant the last word. We
ought to make the defense free to introduce any and all the evidence it considers best to introduce. We should, as a consequence of this, hasten the ends of trials, by doing away with
wrangling on the part of attorneys over rules of evidence. By
abolishing the question and answer method of eliciting information from witnesses-a method which consumes a world of time
-we should make the evidence, upon which the jury is to base
its verdict, interesting, and. therefore, more intelligible and easily
followed by that jury: we should follow the natural method of
seeking truth, which in this case happens also to be the best
method : and we should be doing the political prisoner the justice
of drawing the logical conclusion from the premises that political
crime is to be distinguished in our law from common crime,
namely, that a distinction in the nature of the crime carries along
with it a distinction in the nature of the court procedure. All
these chnges I urge primarily for political prisoners. But T do
not hesitate to conclude that the rights of common criminals
and of societ3,-for society, in the case of these criminals, is now
hampered a great deal more than is the defendant in our court
procedure, due to the presumptions and the constitutional prohibitions, and we ought not to make the discrepancy between law
and justice greater than it no.w is-will be better preserved by
the introduction of these changes into our trials.
Certain objections ought now tb be considered. It is said
that the abolition of the rules of evidence is unthinkable; or, at
any rate; that no precedent exists in our country. We have seen
how utterly thinkable and, indeed, realizable the abolition of rules
of evidence is, and we have glimpsed the operation of free proof
on the Continent of Europe. But the ready response is at hand:
"That is a foreign practice: what is good for them may not be
good for us.-!"s Wigmnore, in his powerful introduction to the
28 See my articles, '-The American Student in the French Law
School and
the French'Student in the American Law School," in "Le Bulletin
Maison francaise de Columbia Universitv"-March-April, 1918, New de la
York
City; "Le Secret Professionel," in "Le Bulletin de ]a societ6 des prisons,"
Oct.-Dec., 1907: "'Comparaison du syst nie des r~gles de preuye en France
et
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second edition of Volume V of the Supplement Index to his
treatise on the Law of Evidence, says:
"A complete abolition of the rules is at least arguable, not
merely in theory, but in realizable fact. They are today mostly
ignored in the practice of four important jurisdictions-in the
Interstate Commerce Commission, in Patent litigation, in Admiralty trials, and in (some of) the Juvenile Courts. This shows
that, in the United States, and today, j.ustice can be done without
the orthodox rules of evidence.
"These four exceptional cases are of course explainable as
abnormal. In the first place, there is in all four practices no separation -of jury and judge; and the safeguarding of the lay
jurors from misleading evidence is the main reason for the
orthodox system of evidence. In the next place, there are no
lawyers (ordinarily) in the Juvenile Court: while, on the other
hand, the practice of the first three classes of cases named is
chiefly in the hands of a select group of specialists, both judges
and lawyers; and this makes for mutual confidence, discouraging
petty evasions of the rules and also petty insistence on them."
The abolition of the rules would add to the strength of the
movement for better jurors. Our present system of jury trials
is marked by exemptions and by inferiority of jurors. The
inferiority is due directly to two matters: first, the statutory
exemptions allowed, and second, the practice of attorneys, connived in by the judges, of weeding out of the panel of jurors any
persons who might by any possibility be intelligent and competent
to pass upon the questions at issue. The more of a Tom Noddy
the juror is, the less he knows about what is happening around
him, the greater ignorance he has of history and human experience, and even of human nature, the more readily acceptable he
is to the contending attorneys. The theory of our law that
jurors are to be safeguarded from misleading evidence is based
upon the paternal doctrine that a layman cannot reason upon
the facts unless these facts be presented in a particular way.
And by statute and by practice in our courts we declare by our
acts the reason for such careful safeguarding. The cat's out
of the bag. The reason is plain. We make the jurors incompetent, and then we must protect them-and ourselves from their
ignorance. Evidence has therefore been influenced, in part, by
our American practice of sifting out the strong and accepting
aux P-tats Unis." in "Le Bulletin de la societ6 des etudes Ugislatives," Paris,
Janvier, 1918; "The Procedure in the Cour D'Assises of Paris," 18 Col. Law
Rev. 43.
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the weak. Herein, I should say, lies an interesting channel for
speculation.
As for the other point touched on by Wigmore-the fact that
the practice is in the hands of a group of specialists-it'may be
said that in Europe generally the problem is simpler than it is
here. There there is a separation between office lawyers and trial
lawyers, and specialization and expertness and brea'th of mind
in trying cases are the common possessions. But it should be
noted that after the abolition of all rules of evidence in the trial
court no expertness in the application of rules is required; no petty
insistence on the rules is possible; no petty evasions of the rules
are encouraged. I am arguing for the full and complete unshackling of the fetters from fact. There is no half measure.
We must go to one extreme or the other. Quibbles and quirks
will otherwise be the result.
I am aware that there will always, theoretically, be the
problem of the judge of admitting certain evidence and excltiding other evidence. This, though a problem frequently forgotten, js nevertheless one that is in theory possible,- and sometimes arises in practice. But we should be astonished to see how
few the occasions are which spring up to baffle judges or attorneys, and, indeed, how rarely the mere possibility comes to the
surface at a trial that certain testimony will not be heard. Over
and over again in my attendance at French trials I have prepared
for an interesting "incident personnel" between the judge and
the attorneys for the defense-only to be disappointed. Almost
never is testimony rejected that can in even the remotest way
throw light upon the case: and the Continental system is so
liberal that on occasion individuals whose testimony will notand it is previously known that it will not-throw any light upon
the facts of the case are allowed to come to thd stand and give
their "depositions," that is, to make their declarations. The
instance which most often .produces such a proceeding is when
a witness has made some remark derogatory to another who
may not have anything to do with the facts at issue of a case,
but who is permitted to take the stand in defense of his reputation. This may be going too far. But it is to be remarked that
the occasions are rare, that "when they do arise they are soon
over, and that the spirit of independence is so great that a person
may not be defamed even in a court of justice.
I do not follow Dean Wigmore when he says (p. xv) that
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"to abolish the bulk of the rules, in the ordinary courts would
be a futile attempt . . ..
you cannot by fiat legislate away
the brain-coils of one hundred thousand lawyers and judges;
nor the traditions embedded in a hundred thousand decisions and
statutes." I may appear to be wise after the event. But surely,
whether or not we could from a study of past history deduce the
proposition I am about to lay down, there does not seem lo be
much wisdom in now affimning that revolutionary changes utterly
unthinkable a few years ago are now taking place all around
us; and the comparatively simple matter of the abolition of a
highly technical and intricate system of rules which have grown
up through centuries from precedent to precedent in a wilderness
of single instances, which Wigmore rightly says were hot systematized till very -recently, is a change we can bring about if
we have the will to do it. The Continent of Europe had rules
of evidence, and the transformation came. I fe.ar we in America
bahk too little upon the resiliency of the human mind and too
much upon stare decisis.
But Wigmore has this much right on his side that the force
of circumstances and training is so great that lawyers keep on
contending in the same old way for insignificant details, concerning the introduction of insignificant facts long after the jury
has passed out of their ken. Witness their bickerings and their
insistence upon exclusionary rules even when the case is being
tried before a judge acting as jury.
It is said by Wigmore that the growth through contact with
human experience of the law of evidence gives the rules the
weight -of reality. But the system of rules in medieval times
arouses-and justly-our mirth, though that system was also
the result of contact with human nature. And despite the fact
that that ridiculous system existed for long, human experience
outlived it, and when the human mind saw its injustice and its
inanity courageous peoples threw it over for a saner system.
Now it is, according to the Continental peoples, the present free
proof system that is in accord with the experience of human
nature.
It would be interesting, though the length of the discussion
would here be prohibitive, to follow the Anglo-American system
of evidence into its details, compare it with the system of free
proof, show for each of the many rules the value of the reasons
adduced, and indicate how these reasons when sound are modified
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by other reasons which favor the free proof method. Ilut I cannot let this occasion go by without reference
to what has been
called"the greatest and most distinctive contribution
of AngloAmerican law (next after the jury trial) to
trial
procedure.
lenthlam thought this much of it and we can
in this conviction. Hlut if it is the greatest afford to continue
and most
it is also (like other great truths) overworshipped valuable,
and overwvorked,-especial. in its unessential details. The
difficulty
about
it is that it has two principal aspects, one of
which is vital and
the other of which is not.
"'The vital aspect is that we are not to credit any
man's assertion until w'e have tested it bi- bringing him
into
court
(if we can
g-et hini) and cross-e.raminim hin.. Now, the
development of
this art of cross-examination during two centuries,
is the great
valuable contribution of the rule. Here modern
psychological
science confirms emphatically this empiric
result: for it has
shown us something of the hundred lurking sources
of errors that
inhere in all testimonial assertions; and we now
perceive
thal our
traditional expedient of cross-examination was
the
true
way to
get at the sources of error, and that it owes its
primacy to permanent traits of the human mind. To abandon
the necessity of this test would be to surrender our insistence on
anywhere invented of getting at the truth of the best expedient
this reason, the abandonment'of the Hearsay controversies. For
Rule, in this vital
aspect, is unthinkable.""
But we can, under the free proof system, cross-examine;
and
we can go further than the Continental peoples
and insist, as
we do now, upon the right, which, by the way,
in this country in
practice may be and is sometimes seriously
trammelled by the
judge. The Continental peoples have the right
of cross-examination, theoretically, through the President: but
I have seen questions put--of course with the consent of the
President of the
Court-directly to a witness on cross-examination.
I did not see
any prolonged cross-examinations; but I was
assured that when
the occasion requires it, extended, elaborate,
and severe crossexamination does take- place. And the records
of trials prove
that this is so. The reasons. for the lack
of frequent crossexamination are several, among which are the preliminary
investigation, which is thorough and which has included
cross-examination: and the previous examination by the court
and the lawyers
of the dossier-the evidence presented before
the examining and
investigating magistrate.
29

Wigmore, op. cit. p. xxviii.
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But there is yet more. The witness who makes the hearsay
statement is subject to cross-examination, though the individual
who is said to have made the statement extra-judicially is not
brought before the court to give his testimony. And this hearsay witness may be examined as to his sources of knowledge;
and evidence may be introduced to rebut the hearsay statementa thing which is sometimes done. The hearsay statement is made
and received for what it is worth. This is certainly done in
actual life, and it is not a far cry-or ought not to be-from
actual life to court trials. Further, if the hearsay statement is
important, the man who made the statement extra-judicially is
brought to court. It can be seen that it is to the interest of
the parties to present important evidence by the mouths of, the
most competent witnesses; and we therefore find that as a result
either the prosecution or the defense will not allow an important
statement for its case to rest upon the unsupported word of a
man who shows by hearsay testimony that the actual eve-witness
to the facts of which he gives testimony is another. For instance,
A takes the stand and says B said X struck Y. If the prosecution rests there, the weight of the testimony of A would not be
great. The evidence would, under the Continental system, be
admissible: but this is a long way from saying it would be sufficient proof of the fact that X struck Y. The prosecutor would
bring on the witness B. Cross-examination of A would show,
perhaps, that little if any weight was to be attached to B's statement, because, for instance, B was an enemy of X, or because A
cannot hear well. This is the method we employ in our ordinary
affairs, and it cannot well be maintained that in these affairs we
are at a loss for a proper solution of many problems, any more,
indeed, than we are in courts of law. What the hearsay rule
does is this, in some cases: it prevents any evidence whatever
from going to the jury and deprives the jury of any means of
arriving at a proper conclusion. The discrepancy between court
justice and extra-judicial justice is marked. What is produced on
the offer of hearsay evidence is this: there is objection, there is
discussion, there are obstructive tactics, there is confusion, there
is uncertainty in the minds of the jurors, and, in short, there is
great waste of time, confusion of issue and dissatisfaction on the
part of the jury because of lack of full testimony.
The method of presenting evidence in the two contrasted
systems is next to be inquired into. The Anglo-American method
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is clear, simple, and logical: the Continental is involved and
practical. Curious that the French, for example, who are known
for logic and symmetry should be lacking in a logical and symmetrical system of presenting evidence. But in this case we
find the Continental method fashioned after the practice outside
courts of law. In our system-the product of a practical and
analytical people-the method is fashioned logically and symmetrically: examination followed by cross-examination and this
again followed by re-examination and recross-examination; and
the evidence of the prosecution first presented, and then that of
the defense; and this followed by rebuttal evidence and surrebuttal; and finally the summing up of the defense-the only breach
in the regularity--followed by the summing up of the prosecution. And previous to the introduction of evidence at all, the
exposition of the case by the prosecution and by the defense.
Whereas on the Continent cross-examination may take place during examination: and so may rebuttal, and part of summing up,
and confrontation-just as these things happen in life. And
there is no clear exposition of the case by the prosecuting officer,
but a reading of the indictment; matters of defense are put in
during the case of the prosecution, and the prosecutor sums up
first and the defense last.
The thing to note here is that while the evidence is presented
in an Anglo-Anrerican court with strict logical regularity, abroad
the evidence is presented in what seems to us a haphazard fashion.
The defense of the Continental system may be made upon two
grounds: first, it is the natural if not the logical, artificial system
of searching out the truth; and second, as Wigmore says in his
treatise-section 1368-speaking of the advantages of crossexamination in contrast to the adducing of proof by other witnesses called by the opponent:
"The cross-examination immediately succeeds in time the
direct examination. In this way the modification of the discredit
produced by the facts extracted is more readily perceived by the
tribunal. No interval of time elapses to diminish or conceal their
force. Proving the same facts by new witnesses, after others of
the proponent have intervened might lose this benefit, and the
counsel's argument at the close might not be able to replace it."
So it is that human experience has taught the Continental
peoples to seek out truth in court as we seek it out in our daily
life, and so it comes that the examination and cross-examination
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and rebuttal and surrebuttal are mixed; and the presentation of
the case for the prosecution is intermingled with the presentation for the defense. The evidence over there is introduced
before other facts have intervened-after which that evidence
might lose its force. Simplificative rules of evidence do not
always simplify or clarify.
The third detail of the law of evidence I should like to discuss briefly is the giving of testimony. How the testimony- is to
be presented is a serious problem. Our system prescribes the
question and answer method; the Continental. the deposition or
narrative method. The advantages and disadvantages of the
question and answer method, and the rules devised for the lessening of harm in the search for truth are known to every practicing lawyer and are admirably stated and commented upon in
Wigmore's chapter on Testimonial Narration or Communication.
The method of the direct and untrammelled narration by a witness is unknown to us. On the Continent the right of a witness
to speak freely and fully is sacredly maintained. But it is not
so generally known that after the narrative has been given, the
witness may be examined and cross-examineid. This method,
therefore, presents us with the advantages of the question and
answer method, and with the further great advantages of the
direct method of narration. The saving of time is enormous, as
I can testifv from experience here and abroad. Any one of the
interminable political trials held in the city of _ew York during
the last year and a half, some of which took two weeks and one
of which took eight weeks to try, could have been tried in much
less time under the Continental system of free proof and direct
narration. And yet we hear that to let in all testimony and evidence is to protract unduly the trial of actions. Moreover, it is
said that free proof does not protect the parties, especially the
prisoner, and that the rules of evidence are primarily to guard
against the introduction of evidence harmful to the parties, and
of course, and particularly harmiful to the prisoner. The rules
of evidence in the trials mentioned-as in all others-almost
without exception did nothing else but prevent from going into
evidence a great deal -of testimony which would undoubtedly
have added to the value of the trials as investigations into truth
and might have changed the verdicts.
Nothing, again, can be less interesting or more sterile than
examinations and cross-examinations in our courts. This is
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partly due to our lack of skill, and partly to the inherent defects
of the question and answer method of getting at facts. A narration that would take five minutes is drawn out into an examination that takes two hours; and the facts brought out are not only
shockingly disproportionate to the effort and time, but positively
fewer and less important than by way of unhindered narration.
I have ventured to question some of the conclusions of Wigmore. I cannot leave the subject to which he has given so much
of his time and loving and fruitful thought without declaring
my indebtedness to him as a writer and as a man. We all know
he is a great authority. It remains yet to be generally recognized
that he is an admirable citizen and a great man. It is the facf of
his superb human quality that makes one diffident in questioning
his conclusions, especially upon such a human subject as evidence.
Finally, I use the concluding words of Wigmore in the preface already quoted from:
"General denunciations against the system, and general denunciations against denunciations, will do little service either way.
A great national and racial system cannot be easily set aside;
and its historic growth indicates that it has at least some right
to exist, as it is and where it is. What is needed rather is detailed
study and concrete criticism." 30
2Many national and racial systems-thought to be such at
any rate-have been recently swept aside: and history records
others. The jury system is considered by Anglo-American writers as an Anglo-Saxon institution. Yet we find that this national
and racial institution flourishes on the Continent where it is
according to those writers an exotic: we find also that the
institution is even more jealously guarded there than among us;
and, lastly, we find that it works well among them. Dean Wigmore, himself, in his treatise, and elsewhere, has given us ample
evidence of his broad human sympathy and lack of chauvinism.
Differences between peoples we have in the past exaggerated.
We ought now to emphasize the common racial traits of mankind. These traits, we shall discover, are many: and idiosvncrasihs and peculiarities are few. We are beginning to become
aware of the overweening power of circumstances, of environment. Change this environment, and the change in national and
racial nature will be astounding. We must endeavor to approach
to just relations in society, and these just relations will be repre30 Wigmore, op. cit. p. xxxviii.
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sented on the bench and at the bar. "Sound rules of evidence,
in short, are as much a symptom as a cause of better justice."'"
No more profound truth was ever uttered. The kind of system
of law we have, and of evidence, in particular, illustrates
and
exemplifies our social advance. Since I have been arguing for
the
abolition of all rules, I may be permitted to modify the quotation:
A sound system of evidence is as much a symptom as a cause
of
better justice.
ROBERT FERRARI.
NEW YORK CITY.

31 Wigmore, Vol. 5, op. cit. p. xxxix.

